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Abstract 
Galmiche, D. and G. Perrier, On proof normalization in linear logic, Theoretical Computer Science 
135 (1994) 67-110. 
We present a proof-theoretic foundation for automated deduction in linear logic. At first, we 
systematically study the permutability properties of the inference rules in this logical framework and 
exploit these to introduce an appropriate notion of forward and backward movement of an inference 
in a proof. Then we discuss the naturally-arising question of the redundancy reduction and 
investigate the possibilities of proof normalization which depend on the proof search strategy and 
the fragment we consider. Thus, we can define the concept of normal proof that might be the basis of 
works about automatic proof construction and design of logic programming languages based on 
linear logic. 
1. Introduction 
Linear logic is a powerful and expressive logic with connections to a variety of 
topics in computer science. We are mainly interested in the significance it may have in 
different domains as logic programming or program synthesis through theorem 
proving. As a matter of fact, classical linear logic (CLL) is a logic of actions introduc- 
ing notions like controlled and strict resource management [12,13]. It disallows both 
weakening and contraction in general although they are introduced for local use 
through modalities and it conserves a constructive character with a deep symmetry. 
Linear logic can be an appropriate framework to study logic programming (better 
than intuitionistic or classical logic) [3,6,16], concurrent aspects in logic program- 
ming [4, IS], Petri nets reachability [24]. The main point is the resource-sensitive 
aspect of this logic used, for example, for functional programming [19]. In previous 
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works, we considered the synthesis of correct programs using a theorem proving 
approach in constructive logics with extraction of programs from proofs [S, 91. Based 
on intuitionistic logics, they can present some limits due to the nonsymmetrical 
character of such logics. But we could try to consider this approach in linear logic 
through an appropriate A-calculus as logical language [l, 201. 
In fact, the first point is to understand what a proof or a proof net is, in some 
fragments of linear logic, and also to be able to construct proofs of linear logic 
formulas. Hence, a theorem prover in linear logic can be a first step towards some 
effective applications of CLL based on the development of proofs like logic program- 
ming. For efficiency reasons, the construction of a linear logic prover imposes of 
course restrictions to an adequate fragment of CLL. Some recent works have been 
devoted to this important topic [14,16]. Starting from the fragment of linear Horn 
clauses, they try to extend it in various ways. The difficulty is then to extend the 
expressiveness of the language and to keep, at the same time, the efficiency of the 
initial kernel. Concerning efficiency criteria, we noticed that these works had a com- 
mon point: the necessity to normalize, as much as possible, the proofs in these 
fragments, using some properties about inference permutability. Aiming also to 
extend logic programming, Andreoli [2] has chosen another approach that consists 
in, starting from full linear logic, searching for equivalence between proofs in order to 
normalize them with the central notions of invertibility and focusing. In [27], we have 
a study about proof search strategies in CLL for a bottom-up direction with the same 
notions and also for a top-down direction based on specific resolution method. Even if 
it is not the central point, permutability properties appears in these approaches. It is 
a classical concept in works on the conception of efficient proof search methods in 
nonclassical logics [26,29]. Thus, our approach begins with a systematical study of 
the inference permutability possibilities in full linear logic aiming for efficient proof 
construction mechanization. The first attempt in this direction has been developed in 
[lo] where we have focused on the additive and multiplicative fragment of CLL and 
proposed an algorithm for automated deduction in this fragment. 
In this paper we completely refine the permutability notion and we extend the 
approach to full linear logic. Thus, after having systematically studied, the inference 
permutability properties, we define specific movements of inference in a proof and we 
analyze the redundancy reduction in a proof. Then, we are able to propose new proof 
forms (called normal proofs) that define complete and tractable proof subclasses and 
we discuss its interest for proof construction. Compared to other approaches on 
bottom-up and top-down theorem proving, we mainly focus on logical bases through 
a complete study of the inference permutabilities that could justify further choices of 
some fragments of CIL adequate for applications as logic programming. From this 
point, we should be in a position to study more seriously, in further work, the linear 
logic as a good framework for automated deduction, logic programming and also for 
the programming with proofs approach. 
We present in Section 2 the linear logic framework (language and inference system) 
and recall some basic definitions. Section 3 shows a complete study of the permutability 
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properties of inferences and, in Section 4, we deal with the notion of movement of an 
inference in a proof. Section 5 presents how to reduce some redundancies in a proof by 
appropriate reduction and by cut elimination. Section 6 defines the notion of normal 
proof and to use it for the mechanization of proof construction in CLL in an adapted 
interpretor. In Section 7, we emphasize the importance of this approach for designing 
logic programming languages in adequate fragments of linear logic. Finally, in Section 
8, we discuss the connections with related works in different fragments of CLL and 
then we conclude on the usefulness of these results for application embedding linear 
logic proofs development. 
2. Linear logic 
Classical linear logic (CLL) has been introduced by Girard [12] as a logic of 
actions. Born from the semantics of second-order lambda-calculus, linear logic is 
more expressive than traditional logics (classical or intuitionistic ones). Compared to 
classical logic, two structural rules weakening and contraction are dropped from the 
Gentzen-type rules and thus we obtain a system where each resource (hypothesis) 
must be used exactly once. Thus, conjunction and disjunction, that allow resource 
sharing, are split into a multiplicative version ( 0, p) disallowing resource sharing and 
an additive version (&, 0) requiring resource sharing. To restore power of classical 
logic two modal operators ! and ? are introduced knowing that !F allows unlimited 
consumption of F and ?F allows unlimited use of F. Moreover, the logical constants 
true, false are split into four constants 1, I, 0 and T and an involutive negation 
(denoted by (.)‘) is introduced. 
Characterized by the absence of structural rules and by a specific treatment of the 
negation, CLL has proofs that can be considered as actions and introduces a dynam- 
ical resource management in these proofs without directional character (no distinction 
between input and output). We refer the reader to [ 12,13,25,2X] for a broad explana- 
tion of the purpose and the meaning of linear logic. 
2.1. The language 
The language consists of 
(a) a set of finite terms Term[ V] on a countable set of variables V, 
(b) a countable set of atoms At each having an arity. 
It allows to construct a set Atom of atomic formulas: if n is the arity of the atom a and 
tl, t2, . . . . t,ETerm[ V] then u(tl, tZ, . . . . t.) is an atomic formula, 
(c) a set of logical operators Op = (0, 1, I, T, ( )I, !,?, 0, p, &, 0, V, 3). It allows to 
construct a set Form offormulas that are the formulas of CLL, following the grammar 
F::=O)llIITIAIF’I?Fl!FIF@ FIFpFIF&FIF@ FlVxFl3xF. 
with AEAtom and XE V. 
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Here we manipulate sequents without left-hand sides, using the following notation 
conventions: variables E V will be referred by the letters U, x, y, z, terms E Term [ V] by 
the letters Y, s, t, atoms EAt by the letters a, b, c, atomic formulas EAtom by the letters 
A, B, C, formulas EForm by the letters F, G, H, multisets of formulas E Form by the 
letters r, A. Moreover, the letters can possibly be indexed by integers. 
2.2. The linear sequent calculus 
The inference system we use is the classical linear sequent calculus [12]. Let us 
recall that a sequent t F,, . . . . F. is a finite multiset of formulas of Form. Thus, we 
implicitly take into account the exchange rule and consider the commutative linear 
logic. We present now the inference rules of the linear sequent calculus. 
(1) Identity Group 
t-F,r EF',A 
tA, ax El-,A 
Cut 
(2) Structural Group 
kA 
~ WV 
k ?F, ?F, A 
t-?F,A ' I-?F,A 
C? 
(3) Logical Group 
l Multiplicative rules 
l Additive rules 
l Exponential rules 
tF,?r , kF,r 7 
E!F,?l-' t-?F,r' 
l Quantljiers rules 
t-FCYlxl,r t/ 
k VxF, r 
t- F Ctlxl, r 3 
t-3xF,r 
In the V rule, y is not free in r and in F if y is different of x. 
Let us remark that there is no rule for the constant 0 and that the linear negation, 
that is essential for the symmetrical character of CLL, is defined by the following 
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equalities: 
FII=F ll=_L, _Ll=l, T'=O, O'=T, 
(F@G)‘=F1@G’ and (FpG)‘=F* 0 G’. 
(F&G)‘=F’@G’ and (F@G)‘=F’&G’. 
(VxF)‘=3xF* and (3xF)‘=VxF’. 
(!F)*=?F’ and (?F)=!F’. 
Remark 2.1. If we consider full linear logic, it is equivalent to work with sequents 
without left-hand side part (system called CLL) or with left-hand side part (system 
called CLL’). It is due to the property of the linear negation that allows to move 
a formula from one side to the other in a sequent, by changing it into its negation, We 
have chosen to work in CLL for simplification purposes but, for applications as logic 
programming, CLL’ presents some advantages: for example, it can be restricted 
without difficulty to a fragment of linear logic without negation. As a matter of fact, 
the translation of the results for CLL in CLL’ can be easily performed. 
2.3. Derivations in CLL 
Before proceeding further in our study, it is necessary to fix some vocabulary 
relatively to the notion of derivation and proof in CLL. Let us recall that an inference 
is an instance of a rule of the system defined above and the type of an inference I is the 
name of the corresponding rule, that is denoted by type(Z). 
In a derivation, it will be necessary to follow the evolution of the formulas from the 
time when they are introduced (called principal) to the time when they are used, 
disappearing or becoming subformulas (called ache). To take into account this 
evolution, it will be necessary to mark them in the derivations. We thus give the 
following definitions. 
2.3.1. Principal and active,formulas, contexts 
Definition 2.1. A principalformula of an inference I, such that type(Z) # c?, is a formula 
of the conclusion that did not exist in the premises. If type( Z)=c? the principal 
formula is the result of the contraction of the two formulas in the premise. 
Definition 2.2. The principal part of an inference Z (denoted by dP( I), dL( I), . . .) is the 
multiset of its principal formulas. 
Example 2.1. For the inference I, 3 m we have dP( Ii) = {A, A ‘}. For the inference 
12 = 
tF,A kF’,A’ 
k A,A’ 
we have A,(Z,)=@. 
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Definition 2.3. An active formula of an inference I, such that type(l) # c?, is a formula 
in a premise that does not exist in the conclusion. 
If type( Z)=c?, I has two active formulas (?F,?F) that are the ones contracted in one 
formula (?F). 
Definition 2.4. The active part of the ith premise of an inference I (denoted by di( I)) is 
the multiset of its active formulas. 
Example 2.2. Considering I GM we have A,‘( I)= {F, G}. For I z&$ we have 
A: (I) = 0. Considering the inference 
I- 
EZ-,,F EZ-,,G 
EZ-l,rz,FO G 
we have A,‘(Z)={F} and A:(Z)=(G). 
Definition 2.5. The context of an inference premise is the complement of its active 
part. 
We can classify the inference rules in two categories: the ones depending on the 
context of the premises (those of the &, ! or V type) and the others. It is due to the fact 
that the application of the rules &, ! or V is possible under some conditions on the 
premise contexts. For &, the contexts of the two premises have to be identical, for ! the 
context of the premise has to be of the form ?A and for V the variable y associated to 
the inference cannot be free in the premise context. 
2.3.2. Marked derivations and proofs 
We use the classical representation with binary trees labelled with sequents for 
defining the notions of derivation (or deduction) and proof [7]. Let us recall some 
definitions. 
Definition 2.6. 
Definition 2.7. A marked inference is an inference with a function from the premises to 
the conclusion, that allows to identify formulas in the premises with formulas or 
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subformulas in the conclusion. A marked proof is a proof where each inference is 
marked. 
We can illustrate this notion with the following example 
Example 2.3. In the case of t- A,?A 0 F,?A, we can obtain two different marked 
proofs 
EA,A; t- A,Af 
E A, ?A: E A,?A; 
E A,?Af,?A; t- A,?A:,?A; 
+ A,?A; @ F,?A; EA,?A:,?A;@F 
In general, the choice is neutral w.r.t. inference properties that we want to study. In 
the rest of the paper, even if it is not explicit, we only consider marked proofs. 
Definition 2.8. Let A be a formula of an intermediate conclusion of a proof n of CLL, 
I an inference of II, we say that A is introduced by I if A is a principal formula of I. 
Definition 2.9. Let A be a formula of an intermediate conclusion of a proof 17 of CLL, 
I an inference of II, we say that A is actived in I if A is an active formula of I. 
Remark 2.2. A formula can be introduced by several inferences. For example, let us 
consider the following CLL-proof. 
EA,A’ EB,B’ 
EA@B,A’ 
01 
EA@B,B’ 
02 
F A @ B, AL&B’ 
& 
The formula A @ B of the conclusion is introduced by two inferences: one of type 0 i 
and one of type 02. 
Hence, after this presentation of the logical framework we consider, we can now 
focus on the first important notion that is the permutability of inferences in a proof. 
3. Inference permutability 
We take as our point of conceptual departure the notion of inference permutability 
in full linear logic, It is a basic notion that appears to be very important for an efficient 
proof search (and theorem proving) in nonclassical logics [26,29]. 
We want to systematically study the possibilities we can obtain, from a given proof 
in CLL, other proofs by a simple permutation of two inferences that are consecutive in 
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the proof tree. As an example, we take a proof where an inference of type & immedi- 
ately precedes an inference of type @r. Let us consider the proof Ii’: 
FF,G&Hl,A 
& 
EF@H2,G8cH1,A 
01 
From this form, we can easily deduce the following proof Ii” 
kFOH,,G&H,,A 
This illustrates that the permutation between an inference of type & and an inference 
of type @r is always possible in one direction. The following counter-example shows 
that it is not possible in the other direction. Let us consider the proof 
&41id tB, 
kA@B,A’,B’ @ 
l-- C,C1idEQGB, 
01 
I-C@B,P,P 
0 
t-(~O~)O(CO~),~*,B’ F(A@B)@(C@B),CL,B* 
02 
ä (AOB)O(COB),Al&CI,BI 
& 
It is clear here that we cannot permutate the inferences of type ol and &. Thus, it 
seems interesting to see what happens for each pair of inference types and then to 
analyze the consequences of the permutability opportunities. Let us remark that, 
when two inferences are consecutive in a proof, it is not always relevant to consider 
their permutations. For example, if a principal formula of the first inference is active in 
the second inference then the order cannot be changed. Hence, the following appropri- 
ate definition. 
Definition 3.1. 
in permutation position if they verify the conditions: 
(a) Z2 follows directly Ii in 17 (denoted by Zl\nZ2), 
(/?) the principal part in I, is disjoint of the active part of jth premise of I, where it 
appears, i.e., dP( II) # 49 Z2). 
Intuitively, the notion of permutability is easy to understand. It means the pos- 
sibility to invert two inferences in a proof without disturbing the rest of the proof (the 
parts below and above the inferences). In a previous work on deduction in the additive 
and multiplicative fragment of CLL [lo], we have called it perfect-permutability (pp). 
Should one inference be of type &, there is some difficulty because of the duplication 
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of the other inference (due to the duplication in the context). In [lo] we have 
translated this variant by the notion of quasi-permutability (qp). But such definitions 
were rough and here we have refined them and embedded it in the following general 
definition. 
Definition 3.2. Let us consider a proof ZZ in CLL, I, and I, inferences of Zl being in 
permutation position, I1 is permutable with I, in ZZ if there exists inferences 1; and 
1; such that 
(i) type(Z;)=type(Zr) and type(Zl)=type(ZA 
(ii) the conclusion of Z; coincides with a premise of Ii, 
(iii) if type (I,) = & and Jr is the other inference immediately preceding Zz in 17 then 
type(Jr)=type(Zr). 
(iv) if type( Zr )= & there exists an other inference .Za, such that type( J;) = type( Zz) 
and the conclusion of which coincides with the second premise of Ii. 
(v) Let us consider the derivation (called permutation object) composed by I1 (and 
Jr if type(Zz)= &) followed by Z2 and the derivation (called permutation result) 
composed by 1; (and .Zi if type( Zr ) = &) followed by I;, both have the same conclusion 
and the same hypotheses modulo a duplication of some of them and a renaming of 
certain free variables. 
In the other cases, we say that I1 is not permutable with I,. 
Let us illustrate the definition with the example and the counter-example presented 
in the beginning of this section. 
Example 3.1. Let us consider the previous proof, named ZZ, with 
I, = 
k- F,G,G k F,H,,A 
& and I,= 
EF,G&H,,A 
k F,G&Hl,A tF@H,,G&H,,A 
01 
I1 and I, are in permutation position because conditions SI and p (Definition 3.1) are 
satisfied, i.e., Ap( II ) = {G & HI } and A,( I,) = {F } are disjoint. 
Let us consider 
z,= ä FQH,,G,A ä FQH,,H,,A 
& and I;= 
kF,G,A 
1 
tF@HZ,G&Hl,A kFQH,,G,A 
01, 
the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) (Definition 3.2) are satisfied. 
Moreover, I, being of type &, there exists 
J;= 
EF,H,A 
EF@H,,H,A 
01 
that verifies the condition (iv). 
The condition (v) is also easily satisfied and then I1 is permutable with Zz. 
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Example 3.2. Let us consider the previous proof denoted 17’ with 
II and I2 are in permutation position because conditions E and /I (Definition 3.1) are 
verified, i.e., d,(Z,)= {(A 0 B) @ (C 0 D)} and &(I,)= {A’} are disjoint. But the 
condition (iii) is not verified and thus I, is not permutable with Z2. 
Definition 3.3. A proof Z7’ is obtained by permutation of I, with I2 in II if it is obtained 
by replacing the permutation object relatively to I, and I2 by the permutation result 
(modulo a renaming of free variables and duplication of tree branches above the 
permutation object). 
The operation of permutation of two inferences in a proof implies (because of its 
involutive character) an equivalence relation between proofs. 
Definition 3.4. Let ZZ and 17’ be two proofs of CLL, ZZ’ is equivalent to ZZ modulo an 
inference permutation (denoted by ZZ’ -ZZ) if there exists two inferences II and I, in 
ZZ such that ZZ’ is obtained by permutation of I, with I2 in ZZ. 
Definition 3.5. Let Z7 and ZZ’ two proofs of CLL, ZZ’ is equivalent to ZZ modulo the 
inference order (denoted ZZ’ -* ZZ) if there exists a finite sequence ZZr, . . . . ZZ, of 
n proofs in CLL (n> 1) such that(i) ZZ, =Z7 and ZZ,=ZZ’, (ii) for iE[l, n- 11, ZZ,-ZZi+l. 
Theorem 3.1. The relation -* is an equivalence relation. 
We will now systematically study the permutability properties of two inferences in 
a proof according to their types. Let us remark that the types O1 and O2 have the 
same properties and then we gather them into one denoted 0. 
Theorem 3.2 (Permutability theorem). Let tI and t2 be two types of inference 
(see Table l), 
(i) the case (tI, t2) in the table contains p ifand only tffor any inferences II and Z2 of 
type tI and t2 being in permutation position in a proof ZI, II is permutable with Z2. 
(ii) the case(tI, t2) contains np if and only zf there exists two inferences I, and I, of 
type tI and t2 being in permutation position in a proof 17, which are not permutable. 
(iii) the case(tl, t2) contains a cross x if and only ziffor any inferences I, and I, of type 
tI and t2 in a proof ZZ, I, is never in permutation position with Z2. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By case analysis according to the partition of the inference 
rules into two groups: the ones that depend on the context, i.e. of type &, !, V and the 
other ones. The complete proof is given in the Appendix A. 0 
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Table 1 
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t2 cut 0 63 & 0 ! w? c? ! v 3 I 
cut P 
0 P 
k3 np 
& v 
0 P 
? P 
W? P 
c? nP 
! “P 
P P P P P P P np P P P 
P P P P P P P nP P P P 
“P P P P P P P np P P P 
np np* np* np np np np* np np* np np* 
P P P P P P P nP P P P 
P P P P P P P P P P P 
P P P P P P P P P P P 
“P P P P P P P P P P P 
x x x x “P P P x x x x 
v np P P P P P P P np P np p 
3 P P P P P P P P nP P P P 
I P P P P P P P P np P P P 
Let us remark that the np* in the line of & indicate that this nonpermutability is 
relative to our definition but it can be overcome by a special treatment (see Subsection 
4.2). 
We can analyze the array presented in Theorem 3.2, column by column. When 
a column, like the one of @, contains only one np, it means that we will be able to move 
forward (or down) an inference of type @ in a proof. By repetition of this elementary 
operation, we will move forward, as far as possible, such an inference. But two 
problems can stop such a movement: an inference of type & or an inference where the 
principal formula of the other one becomes active (the inferences are no more in 
permutation position). We can also analyze the array line by line. When a line, like the 
one of? contains only p, it means that we will be able to move backward (or up) an 
inference of type ? in a proof. By repetition of this elementary operation, we will move 
backward, as far as possible, such an inference. The only problem that can stop such 
a movement is an inference introducing the active formula of the other (the inferences 
are no more in permutation position). 
This double analysis leads us to classify the inference types into two groups: the 
ones we can move backward and the others we can move forward as far as possible, in 
a proof. Now, we will study in detail these possible contradictory movements in 
a proof in full linear logic. 
4. Inference movement in a LL proof 
In this section, we define the notion of movement of an inference in a proof. We are 
mainly interested in movements on an inference towards the top of the proof (called 
backward or up movement) and towards the bottom of the proof (called forward or 
down movement). 
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4.1. Backward movement 
Intuitively, it is an iteration of the movement of backward permutation of an 
inference in a proof. This movement can be complicated by the presence of an 
inference of type & that duplicates the inference in backward movement. Then, by 
such a movement, an inference can be duplicated the number of times it goes across 
inferences of type &. Taking this problem into account leads us to the following 
definition. 
Definition 4.1. Let ZZ be a proof of LL and I an inference of ZZ, a proof ZZ’ of LL is 
obtained by backward movement of I in ZZ if there exists a sequence ZZ,, . . . , Ii’, of proofs 
in LL and a sequence Info, . . . . Znf. of inference sets such that 
(i) for any iE[O, n] Znfi is an inference set of 171 (inferences open to permutability), 
(ii) ZZ,-17, ZZ,zZZ’, Znfo={Z}, 
(iii) for any iE[O, n- 11, ni+ 1 is obtained from ni by permutation of an inference 
Ii with an inference Zz of Znh. I/’ and If2 (and possibly Jf’) being the corresponding 
inferences of ZZi+ 1 then Znfi + 1 is the union of the inferences of Z7i + 1 in Znfi and of 
Zf2 (and possibly .Zi’). Znf. is called the inference set of ZZ’ resulting of the backward 
movement of Z in 17. 
Let us illustrate this definition by an example. 
Example 4.1. Let us consider the proof ZZ,, of LL 
we can obtain by backward movement of w? in ZZ, the following proof ZZ3 
EA,A’ 
w ? 
I-B,B’ 
I- A, AL,?C F B, B’,?C w? 
FA@B,A’,?C 
01 
E A@ B,B’,?C 
02 
F A@ B,A’&B*,?C 
& 
t-c,cL 
F(A@B)@C,A’&B’,C’,?C 
0 
We observe that the inference w? get over an inference of type & by backward 
movement in ZZ,, with its duplication as main effect and then the inference set of ZZ3 
resulting of the movement of w? consists of two inferences w?. 
Let us consider again the array of Theorem 3.2, line by line, to see which inference 
types are well adapted to the backward movement. After the first analysis, it seems to 
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be cut, @,@ ,?, w?, 3, I, but the last one can also be adequate for forward movement, 
as we will notice later on. 
Concerning the inference of type w?, by the Theorem 3.2, there is no problem for 
backward movement of such inference. Moreover, it does not need an active formula 
and it is always in permutation position with the inferences that precede it immedi- 
ately. So we can move it backward up to the axioms. This is illustrated by the above 
example and expressed by the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.1 (Backward movement of w?). Let ZZ be a proof in LL and Z an inference of 
ZZ of the w? type, there exists a proof ZZ’ obtained by backward movement of I in Il such 
that any inference I’ of II’ resulting of this movement is immediately preceded by an 
axiom. 
Proof. By induction on h (h > l), height of ZZ,, subtree of Zl with Z’s premise as root. 
o h = 1. Z is immediately preceded by an axiom in Zl and then we can consider Z7’ E ZZ. 
l Let us assume the property true for a height h (3 1) and prove it for h + 1. 
Let us consider a proof ZZ and an inference I of ZZ of w? type such that the subproof 
tree ZZ,, having the premise of Z as root, is of height h+ 1, the inference I, that 
immediately precedes I in Zi’, is not an axiom because h + 13 2. 
Moreover, Z has no active formula and then I, is in permutation position with Z and 
is permutable with it by Theorem 3.2. 
(1) type( I, ) # &. Let ZZ” be the proof obtained by permutation of I, with Z in ZZ and 
I” the inference of ZZ” corresponding to I, the subproof tree ZZ; of ZZ”, having I” as 
root, has the height h and thus we can apply the induction hypothesis to it. 
Then, there exists a proof ZZ’ obtained by backward movement of Z U in Z7” such that 
any inference I’ of ZZ’, resulting from this movement, is immediately preceded by an 
axiom. 
By the composition of this backward movement with the permutation that trans- 
forms ZZ into ZZ’, we obtain a backward movement that leads from ZZ to ZZ’. 
Thus, the property is true for h+ 1. 
(2) type( II) = &. This case is similar to the previous one except that Z is split by the 
permutation into two inferences I” and J” and thus we have to apply the induction 
hypothesis twice. 0 
Concerning the type ?, the only difference with the previous one is that each 
inference of the ? type contains an active formula and its backward movement is 
stopped by the inferences introducing this active formula. We have the following 
result. 
Theorem 4.2 (Backward movement of ?). Let Zl be a proof in LL and I an inference of 
Zl of the ? type, there exists a proof ZI’ obtained by backward movement of I in II such 
that any inference I’ of II’ resulting of this movement is immediately preceded by an 
inference introducing the active formula of I’. 
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1. 0 
Apparently, by Theorem 3.2, the backward movement of a cut inference can be held 
up by an inference of type !. But, as shown by the following example, this problem can 
be solved and the cut inference has the same behavior as the ? inference and 
consequently it leads to an analogous result. 
Example 4.2. Let us consider an example of backward movement of a cut inference in 
the following proof ZI,, 
F !B,?B*,?A’ ’ k !A,(?A’) @ B, B’ 
F !B,?B’, (?A’) @ B, B* 
v cut 
We cannot permute the cut inference with the ! inference on the left-hand side, whereas 
the permutation is possible with the inference of type 0. 
By such a movement we obtain the proof Ii’, 
The permutation of the cut inference with the ! inference in left-hand side is now 
possible and we obtain the proof II2 
FB,B’ 7 FA,A* 7 
I- B,?B’ FA,?A’ ’ , 
k B,?B’,?A 
w ? 
I-!A,?A’ ’ 
k B,?B’,?A’ 
cut 
F !B,?B’,?A’ 
! 
FB,B’ 
F !B,?B*, (?A’) @I B, B’ 
0 
At this time, the movement stops because the cut inference is no longer in permutation 
position with its immediate predecessors. 
Theorem 4.3 (Backward movement of cut). Let IZ be a proof in LL and I an inference of 
Il of the cut type, there exists a proof ll’ obtained by backward movement of I in Il such 
that for any inference I’ of IIf resulting of this movement, the inferences preceding 
immediately I’ introduce its active formulas. 
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Proof. By induction on the number n of inferences preceding I in ZZ. 
l n =O. There is no proof ZZ where Z is not preceded by an inference and thus the 
property is true. 
l Let us assume the property true until any order n and prove that it is true for n+ 1. 
Let us consider a proof ZZ and Z an inference of type cut preceded by n+ 1 inferences 
in ZZ, 
Case 1: One inference immediately preceding Z is not of the ! type and does not 
introduce an active formula of I. Let I, such an inference, by Theorem 3.2, we can 
permute I, with Z to obtain a proof 17” where the inferences corresponding to Z are 
preceded by n inferences. Thus, we can apply the induction hypothesis and we obtain 
by backward movement of these inferences in ZZ“ a proof ZZ’ verifying the given 
criteria. 
By composition of these movements with the permutation leading form ZZ to ZZ” we 
obtain a backward movement from 17 to 17’. 
Case 2: The inferences immediately preceding Z are of type ! or introduce an active 
formula of I. 
Subcase 2.1: The inferences immediately preceding Z introduce the active formulas 
of I. In this case the proof ZZ’ we search is ZZ. 
Subcase 2.2: One inference immediately preceding Z is of type ! and does not 
introduce an active formula of I. 
Let I, be such an inference being of the form w where ?F is active in I, the % n 
other inference preceding immediately Z contains ! F ’ in this conclusion and necessar- 
ily introduces !F I. Then ZZ has the following form 
t?F,G,?A, , t- F’,?A; , 
t?F,!G,?A, ’ t !F’,?A:, 
k !G,?A,,?A; 
cut 
We can then permute I, with Z to obtain the proof 
t- F’,?A:, , 
k?F,G,?A, k!F’,?A,: ’ 
k G,?A,,?A,: 
cut 
k !G,?A,,?A,: 
! 
There are n inferences preceding the new cut and then we can apply the induction 
hypothesis to them and go on as in the case 1. [7 
Example 4.3. Let us consider a backward movement of @ in the following proof ZZ, 
82 D. Galmiehe. G. Perrier 
we obtain by permutation of w? with @ the proof II, 
w? 
The permutation of @ with ! is not possible and the backward movement stops at this 
step. 
Theorem 4.4 (Backward movement of a,@, 3). Let ll be a proof in LL and I an 
inference of Il of type 0, @ or 3, there exists a proof 17’ obtained by backward 
movement of I in II, such that any inference I’ of II’ resulting of this movement is 
immediately preceded by an inference that introduces an active formula of I’ or by an 
inference of! type. 
Proof. The proof has the same scheme as in the case of weakening. 0 
It is also possible to move backward (or up) the inferences of! type in a proof. But, 
taking into account the particular behaviour of the ! rule, this movement is not 
possible by successive permutations but only possibly by jumps from an intermediate 
conclusion of the form E F,?A to another one of the form I- F,?A’, if we do not have 
& in the fragment we consider. 
4.2. Forward movement 
Intuitively, it is an iteration of the forward movement of an inference that permutes 
with another in a proof. This movement can be complicated by the meeting, during 
this process, of an inference of type & with a contrary effect as for backward 
movement. Then, by such a movement, the inference is not duplicated but merged 
with another one that provides from the other branch of the proof tree. Thus, starting 
from a set of inferences, we terminate the movement with only one inference. That is 
the reason why the forward movement notion is defined by duality from the backward 
movement. 
Definition 4.2. Let n be a proof of LL and I an inference of n, a proof II’ of LL is 
obtained by forward movement of I in IZ if there exists an inference I’ of II’ such that 
Il is obtained by backward movement of I’ in II’ and I is one of the resulting 
inferences. I ‘, that is unique, is called the inference resulting of the forward movement of 
I in II. 
Let us illustrate this definition by an example. 
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Example 4.4. Let us consider a forward movement of V in a proof. Let IZe be the proof 
t- (3yu(y)) 0 B, VZU(Z)~, (B’ 0 c(z)) w1 
F (3~4~)) 0 B,PWZ)~)@(B~ 0 44) @ 
By permutation of @ and V we obtain the proof II, 
t- 44, 441 
k 3Y4Yh 4+ 
3 
FB,B’ 
E (3~4~)) 0 R441,B* 
0 
F (3~4~)) 0 B,Vz+)‘, B’ 
V 
~(~ya(y))OB,Vza(z)‘,(B’Oc(x)) @I B 
+ (3~4~)) 0 B,CWz)‘)@(B 0 c(x)) 
By permutation of @ 1 and V we obtain the proof 17,. The permutation implies the 
renaming of the variable x in the subtree having the conclusion of @ as root. 
E 44,4# 
k 3Y4Y)Y 4e 
3 
FB,B’ 
›(~~4y))OB,44’,B’ @ o 
ä (~ya(y))OB,a(u)*,B*Oc(x) ’ 
t- (3~4~)) 0 B, Vz@)‘, (B’ 0 c(x)) 
k (3~4~)) 0 4 bWz)‘)@(B’ 0 44) 
V 
--P 
Let us consider again the array of Theorem 3.2, column by column, to see which 
inference types are well adapted to the forward movement. The result is that, after 
analysis, the adequate inferences are @, &, c?, V, 1. On the contrary of what happens 
for the case of backward movement, they all have the same behaviour (or almost, 
because of c? we are obliged to extend the notion of permutability of two inferences). 
Then we have only one theorem, illustrated by the above example. Apparently, the 
inferences of type w? and @ could rank also among this category but we shall see at 
the end of the proof of Theorem 4.5 why it is false. 
Theorem 4.5 (Forward movement of @, &, c?, V, I). Let 17 be a proof in LL and I an 
inference of 17 of type p, &, c?,V, I, there exists a proof Ill obtained by forward 
movement of I in Il such that the inference I’ of 27’ resulting of this movement is either 
the lust inference of II’ or isfollowed by an inference with the principalformula of I us the 
active formula. 
Proof. By structural induction on Il. We can restrict this proof to a proof II where the 
principal formula of I is not active afterwards (it is then in the conclusion of ZI) 
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without loosing generality. 
Let us denote I1 the last inference of ZZ. 
Case 1: Z = I!. The proof ZZ’ is equal to ZZ. 
Case 2: ZfZl. 
Subcase 2.1: type(ZJ # &. We apply the induction hypothesis to the subproof ZZ1 of 
the premise of Z, that contains the principal formula of I. 
By forward movement of Z in ZZ, we obtain a proof ZZ; ending with an inference 
Z; resulting of this movement. 
Let us replace ZZ, by ZZ; in ZZ, by Theorem 3.2, Z; is permutable with Z, and we 
obtain the proof ZZ’ through this permutation. 
Subcuse 2.2: type(ZJ = &. Let F be the principal formula of I, ZZ has the following form: 
kF,G&H,A 
Let us assume, for example, that Z is an inference of Zi’, and let J be the inference of ZZ2 
introducing F, we distinguish two cases, according to the relationship between the 
type of J and the type of I. 
(c() F f F’. In this case, Z and J have the same type and we apply the induction 
hypothesis to ZZ, with Z and to Zi’, with J. By forward movement of Z in ZZ, we obtain 
a proof ZZ; ending with an inference Ii resulting from this movement. In the same way, 
by forward movement of J in ZZ2 we obtain a proof ZZ; ending with an inference Jr 
resulting from this movement. By replacing ZZ, and ZZ, by ZZ; and ZZ; respectively in 
17 and then by permutation of I1 with Z, we obtain the proof ZZ’. 
(/I) F=?F’. In this case, we apply the induction hypothesis on ZZ,. By forward 
movement of Z in ZZ1 , we obtain a proof Z7; ending with an inference I,, resulting from 
this movement, that is necessarily of c? type. Let us replace ZZ, by ZZ; in ZZ to obtain 
the following proof 
I-?F’,G&H,A 
& 
By introducing an inference of type w? at the end of ZZ2, we can then permute I, with I, 
to obtain the proof ZZ’ (it implies an extension of the permutability notion but it is not 
a problem). 
: I t?F’,H,A 
fl2 
E?F’,?F’,H, A 
w ? 
n; 
k?F’,?F’,G, A 
k-?F’,?F’,G&H,A 
& 
t?F’,G&H,A 
c? 0 
On proqf normalization in linear logic 85 
Remark 4.1. The following counter-examples illustrate well why the previous the- 
orem cannot be applied to the inferences of type @ or w? 
Concerning the inferences of type !, it seems difficult to move forward such 
inferences in a proof. It is true when we try to move it by successive permutations. But 
the ! inferences have the specific property, under some conditions, to be able to 
disappear in some points of a proof to appear again much further forward. It is 
pointed out in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.6 (Forward jump of !). 1f a sequent of the form I- !F,?A is provable 
then there exists a proof of this sequent which ends with the inference introducing 
!F. 
Proof. If a sequent of the form t !F,?A is provable and ZI is a proof of it, we can 
modify it in the following way. At first, we replace, by starting from the final 
conclusion in all intermediate conclusions, the formula !F by F to the inferences which 
introduce it and we delete these inferences. Next, we add the following inference B 
at the end of the proof. 
It is clear that the resulting tree is definitely the proof we search. 0 
A consequence of this theorem is a possibility of forward jump of ! in a proof. 
Remark 4.2. If we consider the inference types, we observe that we have different 
groups of inferences with respect to the permutability properties and the movement of 
an inference in a proof. We have two principal groups of inference types that are the 
ones to move down and the ones to move up. Let us remark that the partition 
between both the groups depends on the proof search direction (bottom-up 
or top-down) we choose, as we will see in Section 6. Moreover, they correspond 
to the groups of connectives obtained by partition in [2] with respect to a 
notion of synchronization and determinism. But there are differences concerning 
the treatment of ? and !. The connective ?, considered as asynchronous by 
Andreoli [2], corresponds in our work to the three rules c?, w? and ? that 
behave differently. ! that is member of the group of synchronous connectives is 
moved forward in our work. Our own classification is based only on permutabil- 
ity properties in the framework and on their logical consequences. That is the 
reason why we do not tell about the constants 0, 1 and T that are produced by 
axioms. 
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5. Redundancy reduction 
The study of the forward and backward movement in the CLL proofs provides 
through the previous results and theorems tools to order the inferences inside a proof 
with a view to giving what can be called a normal form. Before defining this notion, let 
us treat a question that is strongly connected to this objective: how can we eliminate 
some reasons of redundancy in a proof? 
Definition 5.1. A proof of CLL is redundant if two of its consecutive intermediate 
conclusions are identical. 
If, from a given proof, it is easy to construct an equivalent one which is not 
redundant, it is more difficult to construct directly, from a given sequent, a nonredun- 
dant proof (without needing to check it a posteriori). 
5.1. Cut elimination 
The cut rule is one of the reasons for redundancy. If the Theorem 4.3. motivates the 
backward movement of cut inferences in a proof then it does not eliminate them. Let 
us consider this result on cut elimination as an extension of this theorem. Considering 
a proof of CLL, a cut can be moved backward up to the inferences introducing its 
active formulae. These ones have dual types and then we can move it again of one step. 
After this, we can apply again the theorem and so on. But how can we be sure that this 
process terminates? Neither the height of the successive proofs nor the inference 
number decreases systematically during this process. Thus it is necessary to define an 
appropriate new decreasing function presented below, which is possible with the 
notion of complexity of cuts in a proof. 
5.1.1. Complexity of cuts in a proof 
Definition 5.2 (Formula complexity). Let ZZ be a proof of CLL and F a formula 
occurrence in the conclusion of an inference I of ZZ, the complexity of the formula F the 
integer c(F) is defined inductively by: 
_ if Fed, and if type(Z)E{ax, w?, I} then c(F)= 1. 
- if Fed, and if d,(Z)#O then c(F)= 1 +max{c(G), Gad,}. 
_ if F&d,(Z) then c(F)=max{c(F’), F’ premise of Z and F=F’}. 
Definition 5.3 (Cut complexity). Let Zl be a proof of CLL and Z a cut inference in 
ZZ the active formulae of which being F and F I, the complexity of the cut Z is the 
integer defined by c(Z) = c(F) + c(F I). 
Until now, these definitions did not present difficulties, but the next one is more 
subtle. If we define the complexity of the cuts in a proof as the maximum of the 
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complexity of its different cuts, it can be very difficult to prove that we can decrease 
this complexity. The reduction of the complexity of a particular cut could imply the 
increasing of another cut, being above. That motivates the following definition. 
Definition 5.4 (Cuts complexity in a proof ). Let I7 be a CLL proof, the complexity of 
the cuts of 17 is the integer c(n) that is equal to zero if n has no cuts and to the 
maximum of the complexities of cuts that are not preceded by another one. 
5.1.2. Cut elimination 
Theorem 5.1 (Complexity reduction). Let Il be a proof in CLL of a sequent t- A with 
only one cut, there exists a proof II’ of t- A such that c(LI’)<c(LI). 
Proof. The complete proof is given in Appendix B. 0 
The cut elimination theorem is a direct consequence of the Theorem 5.1, but its 
proof uses a particular strategy of cut reduction and thus our theorem is a theorem of 
weak normalization knowing that strong normalization is verified for linear logic 
Cl21. 
Theorem 5.2 (Cut elimination). If t A is a provable sequent of CLL then there exists 
a proof of F A without cuts. 
Proof. Let n be a proof of CLL, for nE[O,c(L7)] we have the property 
P(n): there exists a proof Ii’, with the same conclusion as II such that 
c(n,) = c(n) - n. 
This property is an immediate consequence of the Theorem 5.2. It is sufficient then to 
apply p(W)). 0 
Theorem 5.3 (of subformula). Let IZ be a CLL proof without cuts and k A its con- 
clusion, for any intermediate conclusion t- A’ of IZ, a formula of I- A’ is a subformula of 
+A. 
Proof 5.3. By induction on h, height of E A’ in II. 
l h =O. In this case F A’ is F A and the property is true. 
l Let us assume the property true for any order h and show that it is true for h+ 1. 
Let F A’ be an intermediate conclusion of n being at the height h + 1, it is a premise of 
an inference I the conclusion of which is at height h. 
Let F be a formula of F A’, I is not a cut and then there exists a formula F’ of 
a sequent t A” such that F is a subformula of F’ (extending the subformula notion for 
3 and V). 
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t A” being at height h in II, the induction hypothesis is applied to it and F’ is 
a subformula of a formula F” of E A. 
Then, by transitivity, we deduce that F is a subformula of F”. El 
Let us recall that this theorem of subformula is naturally the basis of proof search 
methods in bottom-up approaches but also in top-down approaches. 
5.2. Weakening and contraction reduction 
The cuts often generate redundancy in a proof but it is not the only reason. For 
example, the following proof 
I-?A,A* 
is redundant but does not contain cuts. It seems that it is connected to weakening and 
contraction rules that interact. 
Definition 5.5. A proof II of CLL is under weakening and contraction reduction if for 
any intermediate conclusion under the form E ?F,?F, A, 
(i) if it is the conclusion of a w? rule introducing a formula ?F then there exists an 
inference J (#c?) introducing the other formula ?F. 
(ii) if it is the premise of a c? rule with ?F being one of its active formulae then, for 
each formula ?F, there exists an inference J (Zw?) that introduces it. 
Remark 5.1. In the case where the weakening is done immediately after the axioms 
the condition (i) is always true and then (ii) is the only condition to satisfy. 
Theorem 5.4. For any CLL proofl7 with E A as conclusion there exists a proof IZ’ of 
E A under weakening and contraction reduction that is obtained by elimination of some 
weakening or contraction inferences and also addition of some intermediate conclusions. 
Proof. By induction on h, height of the proof II. 
l h = 0. There is no proof 17 with h = 0 and thus the property is true. 
l Let us assume that we have the result for any proof tree with height h and prove it 
for h+ 1. 
Let II be such a proof tree, if it is under weakening and contraction reduction we have 
the expected result, if not it contains an intermediate conclusion k Al of the form 
I- ?F,?F, A that does not verify the condition (i) and (ii) of Definition 5.5. 
(cz) A does not ver$y the condition (i). We suppress in II the weakening the con- 
clusion of which is E A 1 and all contractions introducing one of the formulae ?F and 
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we add ?F to intermediate conclusions situated between them. Thus, we obtain a proof 
II” of height h- 1 with the same conclusion as II and we can apply the induction 
hypothesis to it. 
(/I) A does not verifv the condition (ii). We use the same proof scheme as in a. 0 
Theorem 5.5. A proof of CLL without cuts and contractions is not redundant. 
Proof. This proof is based on the fact that for each inference the conclusion contains 
a number of logical connectives greater than the one of each premise. 0 
Unfortunately, the theorem is false if we allow the contractions. Here we give an 
example illustrating this point. 
kA,A’ EA,A’ 
t-A@A’,A,A’ 
0 
t- ?(A @ A’), A, A’ 
? 
kA,A’ 
t?(A@ A’),A@ A’,A,A’ 
0 
I- ?(A @ A’),?(A @ A*), A, A’ 
? 
t- ?(A @ A’), A, A’ 
c? 
This proof is redundant and without cuts. It is even under weakening and contraction 
reduction. That shows that we have not exhausted the subject of redundancies 
elimination in the proofs. 
6. Proof normalization 
From the previous results about the permutability of inferences, the movements of 
an inference in a proof and the treatment to reduce some redundancies, we aim to 
analyze the possibilities of reducing the nondeterminism of the proof search process. 
In this section, we study the proof normalization depending on the strategy we use for 
proof construction. We will see in the next section that it might depend also from the 
fragment of CLL we consider. Thus, we are able to define the notion of normal proof 
that is a special form of proof with certain constraints on the order in which the 
inference rules must be applied. It is a way to consider the mechanization of proof 
construction in full linear logic, these normal proofs constituting a complete subset of 
proofs in CLL. But it would be necessary, in further work, to consider in addition 
semantical properties to improve new strategies for theorem proving in CLL. 
6.1. Normalization and construction strategy 
Independent of the construction strategy, the possibility to construct proofs with- 
out cuts is essential. For a top-down proof search, it allows a goal-oriented procedure 
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because of the subformula property and for a bottom-up proof search we have 
a decomposition process of the formulas of the sequent to prove. 
The theorems about the inference movements lead to a relative ordering of the 
inferences in a proof. Considering a proof as an object, the normalization corresponds 
to a double movement: maximum up or down movements of certain inferences in 
a proof. Considering a proof more as a process (being interested by the construction), 
the normalization corresponds to the application as soon as possible of certain 
inferences and as late as possible of other inferences. 
The theorems of Section 4 help us to determine the first criterion to choose the 
inferences to move backward (up) or forward (down): the facility to do it. 
For example, Theorem 4.5. allows to immediately decompose a formula having & is 
principal connector when it appears in a goal during a bottom-up proof search. On 
the contrary, for a top-down search, the application of the & rule is done as late as 
possible. But this criterion about facility is the not the only one. Another one consists 
of the proof strategy we have chosen (bottom-up or top-down). Thus, for top-down 
search, we have to move up the inferences that are easy to control from the premises 
and to move down at maximum the others. For a bottom-up, we have to move down 
the inferences that are easy to control from the conclusion and to move up at 
maximum the others. 
For instance, if we consider the weakening rule w?, we observe that it is not 
controllable from the premise and from the conclusion. Thus, we have to apply this 
rule as late as possible for top-down and bottom-up proof directions. 
The analysis for the contraction rule c? is different because it is not controllable 
from the conclusion but more easier from the premise. Thus, we have to apply the rule 
as soon as possible for a top-down strategy and as late as possible for a bottom-up 
strategy. 
Let us consider the following example 
t-F,?G,A, t- H,?G,A2 
EF@H,?G,?G,A,,A2 
0 
kF@H,?G,Al,A2 
C? 
t-(F@H)@K,?G,Al,A2 
0 
We have, for a bottom-up approach, moved up c? as far as possible but in this case, 
we do not apply the focusing principle [2, lo] that means here that if we decompose 
the formula (F @ H) @ K we have to go on with it until @ or @ is not the 
principal connective (it is not the case in this example). Thus, if we want to keep the 
movement of c? compatible with thus principle, we can modify the @-rule to the 
following 
I- F,l-,,?A k G, r2,?A 
l-F@G,rl,l-2,?A 
0’ 
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This rule is easily derivable from the initial @ rule and is also complete and it is easy 
to prove that the sequent modified calculus with 0’ preserves completeness [27]. 
Thus, from now, we consider this new version of the sequent calculus. 
When we have fixed the direction of an inference movement in a proof, we have to 
know until where this movement is possible. The general answer is simple: in the proof 
(as object) the inferences will be moved up until the inferences where the active 
formulas are introduced and moved down until the inferences where their principal 
formulas become active. 
That are consequences of the results in Section 4. Moreover, we have to consider the 
coherence of these movements. To be more concrete, we will now consider the 
bottom-up construction of proof in CLL, aiming the analysis the nondeterminism 
forms and their reasons and the reduction possibilities due to the normalization. 
A similar and dual study might be done for CLL and the top-down proof 
strategy. 
6.2. Normalization and nondeterminism reduction 
Let us consider a sequent t- A to prove in CLL, a bottom-up proof search consists 
in building the proof tree from the conclusion to the axioms. The process is a construc- 
tion of a sequence of goal expansions, an expansion of a goal t- A’ consisting in 
replacing it by the premises of an inference that has I- A’ as conclusion. During each 
step, there are three fundamental selection choice points where we have nondetermin- 
ism: the choice of a goal (to satisfy), the choice of a principal formula in a goal and 
finally, from a given goal and a principal formula, the choice of an inference with this 
goal as conclusion and this formula as the principal one. 
(a) The choice of a goal. The nondeterminism concerning this choice is a “do not 
care” nondeterminism in the sense that whatever the goal we choose, the result does 
not change as its form. It is true for normal proofs or not. But the choice has 
consequences on time and space resources used to determine the goal. The study 
about permutability of inferences in a proof and the resulting Theorem 3.2 can help us 
to elaborate some strategies. A sequent is often an element of a particular fragment of 
CLL and the permutation of inferences (and then the normalization) can be done 
more efficiently depending on the sort of fragments. Then it is pertinent to consider he 
goals being in fragments where we expect good normalization properties. Other 
considerations, from a semantical point of view, can help to refine the goal choice. For 
example, a goal being in the multiplicative fragment of CLL is interesting because we 
can apply the duality property [l l] to it. 
(b) The choice of a principal formula. This choice concerns partially a “do not 
know” nondeterminism and a “do not care” nondeterminism. The proof normaliz- 
ation will allow to reduce it directly. 
l if the goal has the form k !F,?A’ then Theorem 4.6 allows us to surely choose !F as 
principal formula of an inference of ! type and to replace the current goal by 
I- F,?A’. 
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l if the goal includes a formula having @, &, V, T as principal connective then we can 
surely choose it as principal formula of the next inference that will reduce the goal 
(Theorem 4.5). 
l if the goal does not have the previous forms and if it contains formulas that are not 
literals, the choice of the principal formula corresponds to a “do not know” 
nondeterminism. But when we fix the principal formula F, we determine the 
principal formula of the inferences that immediately follow. 
If F has @,a, 3 as principal operator, we can surely choose its components, 
when they are not positive literals or not of the form ?G, as principal formulas of the 
inferences that immediately follow (Theorem 4.4). 
If F has the form ?G, it can be produced by three different rules c?, w?, and ?. We 
surely choose an inference of w? type if the goal can be proved by an axiom followed 
by a sequence of weakenings (Theorem 4.1). Else, if F is produced by the ? rule, by 
Theorem 4.2. we can choose the active formula as principal formula of the next 
inference and if F is produced by the c? rule, one of the two active formulas is the 
principal formula of the inference that immediately follows. 
l if the goal has only literals, it is either not provable or it is the conclusion of an 
axiom. 
(c) The choice of an inference. Having a principal formula, its external connective 
determines the inference rule to realize the expansion of the proof tree, except in the 
case of? and also @ for which we have two possibilities. The choice between @ 1 and 
O2 corresponds to a “do not know” nondeterminism that is difficult to reduce. 
The rule being fixed, it does not mean that the corresponding inference is com- 
pletely fixed. It is true in general, except for 3 and 0. For 3, we have to choose the 
term associated to the inference. For 0, we have to split the context into two parts 
that is an important source of “do not know” nondeterminism difficult to reduce. In 
the both cases we can postpone the choice at the level of axioms by using lazy 
methods. 
To summarize, the search of a normal proof imposes constraints to the general 
algorithm for the choice of the principal formula, that reduce significantly the “do not 
know” nondeterminism of it. Moreover, it could help us to elaborate specific tactics 
and strategies for the choice of the goal to prove. But it does provide mechanisms 
for calculating expansions when they are not determined by the principal formula. 
Thus, normal proofs provide logical foundations for the proof search for a given 
sequent. 
6.3. Normal proofs 
To the normalization of proofs considered as processes, corresponds a normaliz- 
ation of the proofs considered as objects. For the full linear logic and for the 
bottom-up proof search direction, we can now define the notion of normal prooj 
Let us begin to introduce this definition, by considering TL and T, the sets of 
inference types defined by TL={@,&,V,I) and Tt={ @,@1,@2,c?,w?,?,3}. 
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Definition 6.1. A proof I7 of CLL is said normal if 
(i) T7 is without cuts, 
(ii) 17 is under weakening and contraction reduction, 
(iii) any intermediate conclusion t- d verifies: 
if t- A has the form E !&‘,?A’ 
then it is the immediate conclusion of an inference of ! type 
else if t A contains a formula introduced by an inference of typee T1 
then it is the immediate conclusion of an inference of typeET1 
else if I- A contains a formula introduced by an inference of 
typeET,/{?,c?, w?} 
then for each premise which is not t !F,?A’, the active formula, if it is 
not a positive literal, is the principal formula of the preceding infer- 
ence. 
else if t- A has a formule ?F as principal formula 
then we have three possible cases 
(1) I- d is the conclusion of a w? rule and the preceding 
inferences are weakenings or axioms. 
(2) l- A is the conclusion of a c? rule and the preceding 
inference is an inference of type ? introducing one of 
the active formulas of the inference ending with t- A 
(3) k A is the conclusion of an inference of ? type 
and the active formula, if it is not a positive 
literal, is the principal formula of the preceding con- 
clusion. 
An intermediate conclusion which verifies this criterion is said normal. 
Example 6.1. The following proof 
is not in normal form because it contains intermediate conclusions which are not 
normal, for example k (A 0 B) @ C, A’& B’, CL. It contains a formula introduced by 
an inference of typee T, (i.e., A’& B’) and it is the immediate conclusion of an 
inference of typeE Tt (i.e., 0). For the same sequent to prove, the following proof is in 
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normal form 
We present now the proof normalization theorem, the proof of which gives us 
a procedure for the transformation and normalization of given proofs. 
Theorem 6.1 (Normalization theorem). For any proof Il of CLL there exists a normal 
proof I7, of LL with the same conclusion. 
Proof. Let us call a quasi-normal proof a proof that verifies all normality criteria of 
the Definition 6.1 except possibly (ii). 
According to Theorem 5.4, it is sufficient to prove that, for any CLL proof there 
exists a quasi-normal proof with the same conclusion. 
Let ZZ be a CLL proof, according to Theorem 5.2, we can also suppose ZZ without 
cuts. In order to normalize it, we can choose between different strategies. We can, for 
example, start with the forward movement of all concerned inferences and then move 
backward all the others. Of course, we must proceed methodically and carefully 
because every new movement does not have to destroy what has been realized before. 
Then, we proceed by structural induction on ZZ. 
Case 1: ZZ is an axiom. In this case, 17 is obviously normal and is the proof we 
search. 
Case 2: ZZ is not an axiom. Let I be the last inference of 17. By the induction 
hypothesis, we can replace the subproofs of the I premises by quasi-normal proofs in 
ZZ. We obtain in this way a proof ZZ’ which is not necessarily quasi-normal. The 
conclusion F- A of I is not always a normal intermediate conclusion of ZZ’. It depends 
on the type of I. 
Subcase 2.1: type(Z)=! It is immediate that E A is normal in ZZ’. 
Subcase 2.2: type(Z)EZ’, Then t- A is not of the form F !F,?A’ and therefore it is 
normal in ZZ’. 
Subcase 2.3: type(Z)ETt\{ ?, w?, c?} According to the Theorem 4.4, there exists 
a proof ZZ”, obtained by backward movement of Z in ZZ’, such that every inference I’ of 
ZZ” resulting from this movement is immediately preceded by an inference which 
introduces the active formula of I’ (if its top connective is not?). 
This operation preserves the normality of the modified intermediate conclusions, 
except possibly the conclusions of the inferences I’. They can contain formulas which 
have been introduced by inferences of typeE TJ. But we can modify this feature using 
theorem 4.5 which allow, for every inference I’, to move forward the problematic 
inferences just after I’. The proof we obtain is then quasi-normal. 
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Subcase 2.4: type(I)E{?, in?, c?} W e use the same process as in subcase 2.3 but with 
variants due to particularities of these types. In its backward movement, I cannot be 
stopped by an inference of ! type and according to the Theorem 4.1, I can be moved 
just after axioms if it is of w? type. 0 
Remark 6.1. The concept of normal proof, because of its static character, does not 
emphasize the essential difference between inferences of type p, &, V, T and the ones 
of type 0, 0, 3, ?. The first ones are completely concerned by a “do not care” 
nondeterminism and the second ones are partially concerned by a “do not know” 
nondeterminism. 
Remark 6.2. Moreover, the existence of a part of “do not care” nondeterminism leads 
to different normal proofs for a given sequent, each being equivalent modulo inference 
permutations. A possibility for handling this specific case of inference permutation 
could be to investigate a notion of proof net and proof net normalization. Proof net is 
a concept in proof theory firstly introduced by Girard for the multiplicative fragment 
of linear logic [12] from the fact that the sequential presentation of proofs with trees is 
inadequate and does not emphasize their meaning. In [1 11, we have investigated 
automatic proof net construction but the point is to be able to extend this notion to 
more important fragments of CLL [S] through a new appropriate representation and 
definition of proof nets. Having it, it would be interesting to apply the previous results 
on normalization directly on this concept with a view to reducing not useful redund- 
ancies. 
As in [16] where the un(form proqf notion is essential for proof construction, we 
have with the normal proofconcept the possibility to found systems dependent from 
proof search in CLL on this concept defining subclasses of proofs that are complete 
and tractable. 
It is important to note that this notion depends on the fragment we consider and 
also on the proof construction direction (bottom-up or top-down). In a general way, 
if we want to build normal proofs in CLL it is necessary to fix some constraints 
about choices, as mentioned above, with effect to mainly reduce nondeterminism 
sources. 
7. Application to linear logic programming 
Until now, we have considered full linear logic and normalization aims to improve 
the efficiency of proof construction in a theorem prover for linear logic. Such a prover 
could be considered as a starting point for a based-on-linear-logic interpretor of logic 
programming. But it seems necessary to restrict the study to some fragments of CLL 
for efficiency purposes. Thus a crucial question arises: how can we determine an 
appropriate fragment? 
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The first point to answer this question is to know the type of problems we want to 
specify with the help of linear logic. Commonly, it is well adapted to the specification 
of dynamic problems where we need a strict and explicit resource management as 
planning [23], natural languages analysis, Petri nets and more generally reactive 
systems. Thus, for a given problem, we can reduce the syntax to the one necessary for 
coding it as for Petri nets where only the { 0, ! -} fragment is involved. At this point, 
nothing tells us if the fragment determined by the problem involves efficient proof 
search procedures. The previous results will help us to analyze the adequacy between 
the fragment of logic and the possible proof search methods. 
To illustrate the application to the design of linear logic programming, including 
efficient proof search procedures, we consider the example of the representation of the 
standard Prolog in linear logic and the analysis of possible proof procedures. Let us 
note that this example is only significant for the illustration of the methodological 
point of view but applications of this approach to other logic programming proposals 
surely will emphasize its foundational character. Let us consider the logical fragment 
of standard Prolog, i.e. Horn clauses. 
Basically, we have a program P and a goal G composed by clauses, each clause Ci of 
P being of the form Ai-=B1,B1, . . . . B,. 
(1) The first step is the translation of the program and goal clauses. Each clause Ci 
is translated in CLL by the formula CL = ! (Vxl , . . . , x,(B, & B2 & , . . . &B, -A)) where 
the Xi (1~ i<m) are the free variables of Ci. 
A goal G is translated by the formula GL= 3y,, . . . , y,(Gr & G2 & . . . &G,) where the 
yj (1 < j<p) are free variables of G and Gr are subgoals of G. 
Thus the general query (P, G) will be represented by the following linear sequent 
c;, . ..) C;kGL. 
To summarize we can say that the Prolog queries correspond to sequents in linear 
logic of the form !Cr , . . . , !Ck k 3x1, . . ., x,G where Cr , . . . , Ck are particular formulas of 
CLL representing the clauses of the program and G is a formula representing the goal 
of the query, both being defined by the following grammar 
C:=XIG-XIVxC. 
G:=XIG&GI3xG. 
where X represents a positive literal, C a definite clause and G a goal. 
Let us remark that here, we have translated a given logical framework to obtain the 
previous grammar about clauses and goals. That is because we have chosen standard 
Prolog as starting point, but a normal approach is to give directly such a grammar 
and to begin the study with it. 
(2) A second step consists in defining the CLL fragment involved by this sequent 
form. Thus, according to the subformula property we can deduce, from the previous 
syntax, the set of inference rules of CLL that will be concerned to prove the 
linear sequents deduced by the first step. For our example, this set of rules is 
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Ro = {+L, kR, !L, w!~, c!~, VL, jR} and we have now determinated the logical fragment 
(denoted LF,). 
(3) A third step consists in studying the logical foundations of this fragment, i.e. 
permutability properties in order to define proof search procedures. Let us remark 
that our results work on sequents without left-hand side part but we can transpose 
them without difficulty for application to classical sequents. The study of inference 
permutability, according to Theorem 3.2, leads to the following results for LF,, 
summarized in Table 2. 
(4) A fourth step consists in studying the possible inference movements in LF,,. To 
do that, we have first to fix a direction for proof strategy, i.e., bottom-up or top down, 
and according to our example, we choose a bottom-up proof search strategy and try 
to order inferences as in the general case presented in Section 4. 
For LF,, the inferences of type &R and jR can be moved forward (or down) as far as 
possible in a proof and the inferences of type -L, !L, w!~ and c!~ can be moved forward 
(or up) as far as possible. Let us remark that VL can be moved up or down and we 
decide here to move it backward. 
(5) A fifth step consists in defining, through inferences ordering, the form of 
bottom-up proof we can construct. From the previous step, a bottom-up proof will 
begin with the application of the ZIR and &R rules for decomposing the goal into 
subgoals. Then, we will apply the !L or c!, rules that correspond to the choice of 
a clause in a program. If we apply the !L rule, we can always have a c!, rule application 
preceding it and if it is useless we can cancel it by a weakening. It means that the 
set of resources of the program will be unchanged until the next step. The backward 
movement of c!~ inferences means that the application of such a rule will be 
immediately followed by !L rule application (the application of the w!~ rule 
could introduce a redundancy that we can suppress). With a selected clause 
being usable through the application of !L rule we can apply it to the V, rule 
because the !L rules have been moved up at maximum. Then we consider the aL 
because the V/L rules have been moved up at maximum and we have a goal of the form 
!r, G- X E Y. 
Table 2 
-L P P P P P P P 
& w x v np np P x 
!L P P P P P P P 
W!L P P P P P P P 
C!, np P P P P P P 
tJL P P P P P P P 
3, P x P P P P x 
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In the classical strategy of Prolog we have X and Y unifiable but here we 
X and Y identical. Let us explain why. The inference to realize has the form 
!r,l-G !T,,XF Y 
!T,,!T,,G*Xl- Y 
have 
We know that it is moved up at maximum and thus the active formula X is also the 
principal formula of the inference just above, even it is an atom. X is an atom and this 
inference is an axiom and consequently X = Y and TZ = 8 and the inference is 
!TtG XI-X 
!r, G+Xt-X 
Here, we have partially the Prolog mechanism without unification because the 
corresponding rules ‘V-1, and 3-R have been applied. To obtain unification, it is 
sufficient to have a lazy application of these rules where the instantiation of the 
variables is stopped until the axioms application. 
We have proposed a simple example, for which we have knowledge about expres- 
siveness and proof search, but we can apply this analysis method to different frag- 
ments of linear logic as in [ 15,16,. 171, considered as basis for linear logic programming. 
8. Related and further work 
This work on proof normalization in linear logic presents similarities and differ- 
ences with other works on various fragments of LL, mainly those focusing on 
extensions of logic programming. The study of permutability properties is significant 
for proof search and theorem proving for non classical logics in general [29]. Shankar 
has presented in [26] a proof search method for intuitionistic calculus, based on the 
permutability possibilities, that could be generalized for our purpose. We will investi- 
gate this point and the connections with our work. 
Our aim, here, consists in having a special proof form, called normal form, in the 
class of equivalent cut-free proofs. In a similar way, Andreoli emphasizes in [2] also 
a subclass of proofs, called “focusing proofs”, which is complete. Let us recall that, in 
a normal proof, the weakenings (w?) are moved just after the axioms, the inferences of 
type 43, &, I, V are moved forward as far as possible (until the principal formula 
becomes active or to the end of the proof), the inferences of type 0, @,?,3,c? are 
moved backward as far as possible (until its active formulae are introduced). So we 
obtain a partition of inference types into two groups with the respect of the notion of 
movement of an inference in a proof. Andreoli [2] proposes a similar partition of the 
connectives, consequently of the inference rules, that is based on notions of synchroni- 
zation and determinism. 
It presents two main differences concerning the treatment of connectives ? and !. In 
[Z] Andreoli considers the connective ? as synchronous, which seems justified by its 
triadic system. But, the syntax of this system masks the point that the three types of 
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inferences introducing ?, w? and c? have no common behaviour which our study 
confirms. 
The difference about the treatment of ! is more important. He considers the 
connector ! as those he called “synchronous” connectives (for example, 0) and does 
not reduce the nondeterminism in this case. Then a principal formula !A is chosen 
with a nondeterminism. But it is possible to suppress it because, as shown in the 
previous sections, in a sequent k !&?A, the formula !A can always be selected as 
principal. For example, if we have to prove E !A,?(A’ @ B),?B’ in [2] it is possible to 
choose ?(A’ @ B) as principal formula, then ?B’ before the right one !A whereas in 
our system we choose immediately !A as principal formula. 
Tammet in [27] concentrates on problems of automated theorem proving in full 
linear logic and investigate general search strategies mainly for top-down direction 
with original proposals for resolution method in CLL. It appears that we might 
consider our approach to refine and define proof strategies for top-down direction. 
Keeping full linear logic for the proof normalization process, leads to some limits 
due to the impossibility to permute some inferences. A way to solve this problem is to 
consider an adequate CLL fragment to go further than in CLL in the inference 
movement in a proof and then in the normalization. For example, in a fragment 
without &, the inferences of type @ can be moved forward as much as possible as 
those of type @. Of course, for the choice of the fragment, there is another important 
criterion to take into account: the ability to express problem specifications in such 
a fragment. Both requirements of expressiveness and efficiency can be contradictory 
and we have to find the best compromise between these aspects. 
In this way, we can mention the work of Hodas and Miller [ 161 and of Harland and 
Pym [ 14,151. The common objective is to extend the expressiveness capability in logic 
programming languages using linear logic and to efficiently construct proofs in the 
logical framework. They consider a two-sided linear sequent calculus without nega- 
tion rule. 
But are, in such a framework, our permutability properties still available? The 
answer is yes if we made a good translation of it. Then any property of an inference 
type (for sequents without left-hand side part) is transposed automatically to the 
corresponding inference type at right-hand side and also to the dual inference type at 
left-hand side (see Section 7). It results from the fact that any rule of the sequent 
calculus without left-hand side part leads to two rules when we consider a sequent 
calculus with it. Moreover, the connective 4, more adequate for logic programming, 
replaces the ccnnective @ but keeps the same properties of inference permutability 
(in fact Ad B=A’pB). 
Briefly, we can say that [16] considers two sorts offormulae (as goals and resources) 
and sequents (as queries) of a specific CLL fragment. The point is that such sequents 
can be proved using the notion of uniform proofs: in a bottom-up construction, the 
right rules are always applied before the left rules. It is the case because, in this 
fragment of LL, the inferences on right-hand side parts of sequents can be moved 
down as much as possible in a proof. This point is strongly connected to the previous 
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results. A complete study could be done on the basis of the method proposed in 
Section 7 to understand and justify the limits and the power of the fragment 
considered. Moreover, a similar study can be done with the approach of Harland and 
Pym [15]. They have proposed also a fragment of LL chosen so that uniform proofs 
remain complete but it presents more difficulty to treat right-hand sides including !, 
with difference of expressiveness in goals and contexts. These works refer to the 
resolution on CLL fragments which appears as a specific rule defined mainly from an 
analysis of the permutation properties as but with a bottom-up proof direction. 
Finally, we cannot forget to mention the relationship with the fundamental results 
about complexity and decidability in LL. Kanovich’s works [17] aim to develop 
a computational interpretation of the logic and to obtain efficient decision algorithms 
based on a bottom-up approach. To do it, he considers the Horn fragment of LL from 
a computational and a logical point of view and then generalizes the approach by 
introduction of the additives and !. Knowing that the propositional linear logic is not 
decidable [21], the main conclusions about this complexity analysis is that the 
multiplicative fragment is NP-complete and the additive multiplicative one is Pspace- 
complete. The connections between our based-on-permutability logical study and the 
various related work presented here are to be deeply analyzed with a view to 
mechanizing proof construction in fragments of linear logic. 
9. Conclusion 
We have considered the problem of proof normalization in full linear logic. The 
solution we propose results from a systematic study of inference permutabilities in this 
logic framework. An issue of them is the effective construction of a theorem prover for 
linear logic in which it is possible to reduce some sources of undeterminism during the 
proof construction. It would be necessary to consider other tactics or strategies for 
proof development based in addition on semantical results. Another issue consists in 
using the analysis on permutability of inferences in designing some logic program- 
ming languages in fragments of CLL with a compromise between the expressiveness of 
the language and the efficiency of the proof construction. This point is strongly 
connected to recent works on some extensions of logic programming [15,16] and 
allows to understand or justify some choices in the language conception. Moreover, 
from this analysis of proof mechanization in linear logic and the better comprehension 
of CLL through this proof-theoretic foundation, we could consider the various 
applications of proof development in linear logic. In addition to logic programming, 
let us mention the connections with some dynamical problems as planning [22] and 
with the proofs as programs approach through adequate typed ;l-calculi. In this latter 
case, a good knowledge about various aspects of proof construction and transforma- 
tion would be necessary to use the algorithmic contents of proofs to prospect for 
example typed concurrent programming and program synthesis through program 
extraction from proofs in this logical framework. 
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Appendix A. Proof of permutability theorem 
Case by case analysis according to the partition of the inference rules into two 
groups: those depending on the context, i.e, of type &, !,V and the others. 
(1) type( Zz)= &. To have I, permutable with Zz, we need in ZZ an inference Jr 
of the same type as I, and the conclusion of which coincides with the premises 
of Zz that is not the conclusion of I,. For any type for Ii, we can find a 
counter-example that does not verify this condition. Then Ii is not always permutable 
with Zz. 
(2) type(Z2)=!. If I, is in permutation position with Zz the context of Z2, being under 
the form ?A, contains d,(Z,) and then we have two possibilities: 
(a) d,(Z,)=@ and type(Zi)=cut, 
(fi) A,(Z,)= {?A} and type(Z,)E{?, w?,c?}. 
(2.1) type(Z,)= cut. In this case, ZZ has the following form 
EF,G,?A,’ kF’,?A,Z 
t G,?A,‘,?A; 
cut 
t- !G,?A,l,?A; 
! 
Let us consider the proof 
tF,G,?A,‘, : 
t- F,!G,?A,l . t- F’,?A,2 
E!G,?A,‘,?A,f 
cut 
If F does not have the form ?F then this proof is not correct and I, is not always 
permutable with Z2. Let us remark that if we extend the notion of inference permuta- 
bility by adding the possibility of inserting new inferences in the resulting proof as in 
[IO] then we can say that Ii is permutable with Z2 in a certain sense. 
In this permutation, we add two inferences ? and ! to obtain the following proof 
I-F,G,?A,’ ? : 
E?F,G,?A,’ ’ , I- F’,?A; , 
E?F,!G,?A,’ . I- !F1,?A,2 CUt 
t!G,?A,‘,?A; 
(2.2) type(Z,)=?. The following counter-example shows that in general Ii is not 
permutable with I,. 
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(2.3) type(l,)=w?. In this case, we have the transformation 
t G,?A, ? I- G,?A, 
I- ?F, G,?A, w’ 
! -Nf 
E !G,?A, 
! 
t- ?F, !G,?A, k-?F,!G,?A, 
w ? 
that is correct. Then I, is permutable with Z2. 
(2.4) type(Z,)=c?. In this case, we have the transformation 
E ?F,?F, G,?A, E ?F,?F, G,?A, , 
I- ?F, G,?A, “? 
E ?F, !G,?A, 
! -4 
E ?F,?F, !G,?A, 
k ?F, !G,?A, ‘? 
that is correct. Then Ii is permutable with Iz. 
(3) type( Z2) = V. Necessarily, the variable y quantified by Z2 is not free in A,. If I, is 
not of type cut, V or 3 the variable y is not free also in A, (or Ai and 4:). Moreover, if 
Ii is independent of the context then Ii is permutable with I,. Let us analyze the cases 
with potential problems. 
(3.1) type(Z,)=cut. The following counter-example shows that Ii is not in general 
permutable with 12. 
E a(Y)>a(Y)l 
k a(Y)*a(Y)l 3 
E 3XU(X), u(y)’ 
E 4YV, 3x44 
cut 
F vxu(xy, 3xu(x) 
v 
(3.2) type(Z,)=&. In this case, we have the transformation 
b F, NY/XI> A, k G HCY/XI> A,
ä F~G,ffC~lxl,A, 
& t--F,ffC~/xl,A, v ä GHCY/XI,~ v 
E F&G,VxH,A, 
V-J+ 
t- F, VxH, A, k G, VxH, A, 
k- F&G,VxH,A, 
& 
that is a correct proof. Then I1 is permutable with Z2. 
(3.3) type(Z,)=V. In this case, we have the transformation 
k FCulxl> GCzlyl, An v t- F [u/xl> GCzlyl, An 
t VxF, GCzlyI, A, v _ t- F Cuixl, VYG, A, 
t VxF, VyG, A, k VxF, VyG, A,, 
v 
If the left-hand side proof ZZ is correct, let us show that the resulting proof ZZ’ on the 
right-hand side is also correct. To do that, we have to prove that the two V inferences 
of ZZ’ are correct. Let us begin with the second one. The first V inference of ZZ being 
correct, u is not free in G[z/y], A,. Then, a fortiori, u is not free in VyG, A,. 
Let us examine now the first one. The second V inference of ZZ being correct, z is not 
free in VxF, A,,. The only case in which z could be free in F [u/x], A,, is the one where 
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z is identical to a. Then G[z/y] E G[u/y]. Since u is not free in G[z/y], i.e. in G[u/y], 
then G[z/y] = G and y is not free in G. 
Thus, by association of any variable, that is neither free in G nor in F [u/x], with the 
first V inference of 17’ we obtain a correct inference. In conclusion, 17’ is correct and 
I, is permutable with Z2. 
(3.4) type(Z,)=3. The following counter-example shows that I, is not in general 
permutable with Zz. 
t 4YX4Y)L I 
I- U(Y), 3X4XY 
F Vxa(x), 3xu(x)l 
v 
(3.5) type(Z1)=!. The following counter-example shows that I1 is not in general 
permutable with I*. 
I-ua,uL 7 
F?a,d . , 
F?u,!d . 
I- Vx(?a), !d 
V 
(4) type(Z,)=! and type(Zz)$(&,!,V}. 
(4.1) I, has one premise. It has the following form 
E F,?A;,?A, , 
t- !F,?A;,?A, ’ 
E !F, A;,?A,, 
Z, 
Let us consider the following proof 
t- F,?A;,?A, 
k F, A;,?A, 
ZI 
I 
E !F, A;,?A. ” 
It is correct iff AL is under the form ?A, i.e, iff Z2 is of type ?, w? ou c?. In these three 
cases, I1 is always permutable with Zz but not in the other cases. 
(4.2) I2 has two premises. Then I2 is of the cut or Q type and ZZ has the form 
I- F,?A;‘,?A, , : 
k!F YA’l ?A ’ >.a> ” t- Ag,A:, 
t- !F, A;,?A,, A:, 
12 
A; not being necessarily of the form ?A, II is not always permutable with Z2. 
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(5) type(ll)=V and typ4~~)4{h!,V). 
(5.1) Iz has one premise. In this case, r;l has the following form 
nt 
t-FCYlXl,&,A” v 
F VxF, A;, A,, 
t- VxF, A;, A, 
12 
Let z be a variable that is not free in all intermediate conclusions of n over Z2 included. 
k VxF, A;, A, 
It is correct because Zz is of one type that does not depend on the context and z is not 
free in AL, A,. Then I1 is always permutable with 1, (when I2 is not of type @ or w? 
a renaming is not necessary). 
(5.2) I2 has two premises. I2 is then of the cut or @ type and II has the form 
n1 ä FCY/XI,A;'>A. v 
tVxF,A;‘,A, 
ä VxF,A;,A,,A:, 
Let z be a variable that is not free in all intermediate conclusions of 17 over I2 included. 
E VxF, A;, A,, A:, 
Here y is not free in AL’ and AL’.’ 
The proof is correct and then I, is always permutable with I,. 
(6) type(ll)=& and rype(l&${&,V$. 
(6.1) I, has one premise. In this case, Ii’ has the following form 
Let us consider the proof 
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It is correct because I2 does not depend on the context and then II is always 
permutable with Zz. 
(6.2) I, has two premises. I, is then of the cut or Q type and then Il has the form 
tFA” A 7 tG A” 
Lki~,d:l,d:, 
A a, n & : 
kALZ,A:, 
EF&G,A;,A,,A:, 
12 
Let us consider the proof 
k F,A;‘,A, t Ah2,A:, 
t F, A;, A,, A:, 
1;. 
I-G,A;‘,A, EAL2,A:, I, 
E G, A;, A,, A:, 
2 
& 
kF&G,A;,A,,A:, 
It is correct and then I1 is always permutable with Z2. 
(7) type(li)i,cl,2)~{&,!,v). 
(7.1) I1 and I, have only one premise. It has the following form 
The following proof is correct (because I1 and I2 do not depend on the context). 
t&&An I, 
t-&,A;,An ’ I, 
k A,, A;, A, 
1 
Then I1 is always permutable with 12. 
(7.2) I, has one premise and I2 has two premises. I, is of the cut or @ type and then 
II has the following form: 
The following proof is correct (because I1 does not depend on the context). 
tA A” A tA” A’ (I>U>” ll>n 
E A,, A;, A,, A:, 
1; 
FA,,A;,A,,A:, 
11 
Then I1 is always permutable with Z2. 
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(7.3) II has two premises and I2 has one premise. (a) type(Z2)#{c?. go}. In this case, 
Ai has at most one formula and then cannot be cut into two non-empty sets: it is 
completely included in one of the premises of I1 (for example, the left one). 
td,‘,d;,d, FLl,z,d:, I 
k A,, AL, A,, A:, 
1 
t A,, A;, A,, A:, 
12 
The following proof is correct (because I1 does not depend on the context). 
F A,‘,&,A, 
-:>A;,4 
1; : 
k A;, A:, 
tA,,A;,A,,& 
1; 
Then I, is always permutable with Z2. 
(b) type(Z,) = p. The following counter-examples show that, in this case, I1 is not 
always permutable with 12. 
kA,A’ kB,B’ 
t-A@B,A’,B’ 
0 
kA,A’ kB,B’ 
kA,A’ 
cut 
F A @ B, A’pB’ @ t- ApA* 
P 
(c) type(Z2)=c?. The following counter-examples show that, in this case, Ii is not 
always permutable with Z2. 
FA,A’ 7 F,A’ 7 
A,?(A’) ’ F A,?(A’) . o 
t- A @ A,?(A’),?(A’) 
k A @ A,?(A’) 
c? 
(7.4) II and I, have two premises. I, is of the cut or @ type then 17 has the following 
form: 
On proof normalization in linear logic 107 
The following proof is correct and then I, is always permutable with 12. 
Ed’ A” A a, a3 n t-A’2 A” a, n 
k A;, A;, A,,, A; 
1; 
EA,2,A; 
ä A,,A;,A,,A;,A:: 
1;. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 5.1 (complexity reduction) 
Theorem B.l (Complexity reduction). Let II be a proof in LL of a sequent I- A with 
only one cut, there exists a proof I7’ oft A such that c(I7’)<c(II). 
Proof. Let I be the unique cut in I7. By Theorem 4.3, there exists a proof I7”, obtained 
by backward movement of I in Ii’, such that for any inference I’ resulting from this 
movement, I’ is immediately preceded by two inferences introducing the active 
formulae of I’. 
Thus, from Definition 5.3, we have c( I’) which is equal to c(Z). In fact, the problem is to 
reduce the complexity of each cut I’ considering the subproof n, of 17” ending with I’. 
Hence, n, has only one cut I’ and then c(n,)=c(Z’)=c(U). 
Let us consider such a cut I’, with several cases according to the form of the active 
formulae of I’. 
(1) The active formulae are atomic or constant. Ii’, can have three different forms: 
(a) 
kT,A kO,T,A’ 
ET,A,A’ (b) 
kI,A EA,A’ tA,A’ 
Ed 
(4 EA,A’ 
In the case (a), it can be replaced by the proof n; =- with c(ZI;)=O<c(n,). In 
the case (b), it can be replaced by the proof 17, which contains no more cut and then 
c(n,) = 0 < c(n,). Finally, in case (c), it can be replaced by the proof n; = m which 
contains no more cut and then c(ZI;)=O<c(n,). 
(2) The active formulae are of the @ and go type. In this case, Ii’, has the form 
and we can replace it by the following proof I7; 
t-F,A,, t-F', G*, A; 
kG’,A,,A:, 
cut : 
kG,A; 
kA,,A;,A; 
cut 
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and we have c(ni)=c(F)+c(Fl) and c(Ui)=c(F @ G)+c(F’pG’)= 
sup{c(F),c(G)}+sup{c(F’-),c(G’)}+2. Then c(n;)<c(n,). 
(3) The active formulae are of the @ and & type. In this case, n, has the form 
and we can replace it by the following proof Lr; 
tF,A, F F’, Al, 
+ A,, A:, 
cut 
and we have c(II;)=c(F)+c(F’) and c(IIl)=c(F&G)+c(FL @ G’)= 
sup{c(F),c(G)}+sup{c(FL),c(G~)}+2. Then c(n;)<c(n,). 
(4) The active formulae are of the V and 3 type. In this case, II, has the form 
and we can replace it by the following proof II; 
when n; is obtained from II, by substitution of F [t/x] to F [y/x] with a renaming of 
the variables that do not respect the condition on V rule. Thus we have 
c(II;)=c(F[t/x])+c(F’[t/x]) and c(II,)=c(F[t/x])+c(F’[t/x]+2) and then 
c(K)<W,). 
(5) The active formulae are of the ! and ? type. In this case, we have three subcases 
depending on the way the active formula of type ? has been introduced. 
(5.1) Introduction by an inference of the ? type. In this case, Ii’, has the form 
kF,A, ? EF’,?A:, 
I- ?F, A, ’ k!F’,?A:, 
! 
E A,,?A:, 
cut 
and we can replace it by the following proof II; 
k-,A, t- F’,?A:, 
E A,,?A:, 
cut 
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and we have c(n;)=c(F)+c(F”) and c(L~~)=c(F)+c(F~)+~. Then c(Z7;)<c(n,). 
(5.2) Introduction by an inference of the w? type. In this case, I7, has the form 
and we can replace it by the following proof n; 
I- A,,?A:, 
and we have c(n;)=O<c(ZI,). 
(5.3) Introduction by an inference of the c? type. 
In this case, 171 has the form 
! 
cut 
and we can replace it by the following proof I7; 
E ?F,?F, A, t- !F*,?A; 
t ?F, A,,?A:, 
cut 
t !F’,?A:, 
E A,,?A;,?A:, 
cut 
~ c? 
I- A,,?A,: 
and we have c(I7;)=c(?F)+c(!F’) and c(n,)= l+c(n;). Then c(n;)<c(n,). 0 
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